Abstract. k-anonymity provides a measure of privacy protection by preventing re-identification of data to fewer than a group of k data items. While algorithms exist for producing k-anonymous data, the model has been that of a single source wanting to publish data. This paper presents a k-anonymity protocol when the data is vertically partitioned between sites. A key contribution is a proof that the protocol preserves k-anonymity between the sites: While one site may have individually identifiable data, it learns nothing that violates k-anonymity with respect to the data at the other site. This is a fundamentally different distributed privacy definition than that of Secure Multiparty Computation, and it provides a better match with both ethical and legal views of privacy.
Introduction
Privacy is an important concept in our society, and has become very vulnerable in these technologically advanced times. Legislation has been proposed to protect individual privacy; a key component is the protection of individually identifiable data. Many techniques have been proposed to protect privacy, such as data perturbation [1] , data swapping [2] , query restriction [3] , secure multiparty computation (SMC) [4, 5, 6] , etc. One challenge is relating such techniques to a privacy definition that meets legal and societal norms. Anonymous data are generally considered to be exempt from privacy rules -but what does it mean for data to be anonymous? Census agencies, which have long dealt with private data, have generally found that as long as data are aggregated over a group of individuals, release does not violate privacy. k-anonymity provides a formal way of generalizing this concept. As stated in [7, 8] , a data record is k-anonymous if and only if it is indistinguishable in its identifying information from at least k specific records or entities. The key step in making data anonymous is to generalize a specific value. For example, the ages 18 and 21 could be generalized to an interval [16..25] . Details of the concept of k-anonymity and ways to generate k-anonymous data are provided in Section 2.
Generalized data can be beneficial in many situations. For instance, a car insurance company may want to build a model to estimate claims for use in pricing policies for new customers. To build this model, the company may wish to use state-wide driver's license records. Such records, even with name and ID numbers removed, are likely to contain sufficient information to link to an individual. However, by generalizing data (e.g., replacing a birth date with an age range [26..30]), it is possible to prevent linking a record to an individual. The generalized age range is likely to be sufficient for building the claim estimation model. Similar applications exist in many areas: medical research, education studies, targeted marketing, etc.
Due to vast improvements in networking and rapid increase of storage capacity, the full data about an individual are typically partitioned into several sub-data sets (credit history, medical records, earnings, ...), each stored at an independent site. 1 The distributed setting is likely to remain, partially because of performance and accessibility, but more importantly because of autonomy of the independent sites. This autonomy provides a measure of protection for the individual data. For instance, if two attributes in combination reveal private information (e.g., airline and train travel records indicating likely attendance at political rallies), but the attributes are stored at different sites, a lack of cooperation between the sites ensures that neither is able to violate privacy.
In this paper, data are assumed to be vertically partitioned and stored at two sites, and the original data could be reconstructed by a one-to-one join on a common key. The goal is to build a k-anonymous join of the datasets, so that the join key and any other candidate keys in the joined dataset are k-anonymized to prevent re-identification.
What Is a Privacy-Preserving Distributed Protocol?
A key question in this problem is the definition of privacy preservation. Simply stating that the result is k-anonymous is not enough, as this does not ensure that the participating sites do not violate privacy. However, since the sites already have individually identifiable information, we cannot fully extend the k-anonymity measure to them. We now give an informal definition for privacy preservation; the paper will then present an algorithm and show formally that it does not violate k-anonymity in the sense of the following definition. Definition 1. Let T i be the input of party i, i (f ) be the party i's execution image of the protocol f , r be the result computed by f , and P be a set of privacy constraints. f is privacy-preserving if every inference induced from < T i , i (f ), r > that violates any privacy constraint in P could also be induced from < T i >.
This definition has much in common with that of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [9] . Both talk about a party's view during execution of a protocol, and what can be inferred from that view. The key distinction is the concept of privacy (and privacy constraints) versus security. An SMC protocol must reveal nothing except the final result, and what can be inferred from one's own input and the result. Definition 1 is weaker (giving greater flexibility): It allows inferences from the protocol that go beyond what can be inferred from the result, provided that such inferences do not violate the privacy constraints.
A more subtle distinction is that Definition 1 is also stronger than SMC. The above definition requires that the inferences from the result r and from one's own input combined with the result (and the protocol execution) do not violate the privacy constraints. The SMC definitions do not account for this.
For example, a privacy-preserving classification scheme meeting SMC definitions [10, 11, 12, 13] ensures that nothing is disclosed but the resulting model. Assume that Party A holds input attributes, and B holds the (private) class attribute: B has committed to ensuring that the class is not revealed for the individuals that have given it data. An SMC protocol can generate a classifier without revealing the class of the individuals to A. Moreover, the classifier need not inherently violate privacy: A properly pruned decision tree, for example, will only contain paths corresponding to several data values. A, however, can use its input along with the classifier to learn (with high probability) the class values held by B. This clearly violates the commitment B has made, even if the protocol meets SMC definitions. More discussion of this specific problem can be found in [14] .
Generally speaking, if the set of privacy constraints P can be easily incorporated into the functionality computed by a SMC protocol, a SMC protocol also preserves privacy. However, there is no obvious general framework that easily and correctly incorporates privacy constraints into part of the functionality computed by a SMC protocol. This paper presents a privacy-preserving two-party protocol that generates k-anonymous data from two vertically partitioned sources such that the protocol does not violate k-anonymity of either site's data. While one site may already hold individually identifiable data, we show that the protocol prevents either site from linking its own individually identifiable data to specific values from the other site, except as permitted under k-anonymity. (This privacy constraint will be formally defined in Section 3.) Interestingly, one of distinctive characteristics of the proposed protocol is that it is not secure by SMC definitions; parties may learn more than they can infer from their own data and the final k-anonymous datset. Nevertheless, it preserves the privacy constraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: Section 2 introduces the fundamental concepts of k-anonymity. Section 3 presents a generic two-party protocol, with proof of its correctness and privacy-preservation property. The paper concludes with some insights gained from the protocol and future research directions on achieving k-anonymity in a distributed environment.
Background
We now give key background on k-anonymity, including definitions, a single-site algorithm, and a relevant theorem, from [7, 15, 16] . The following notations are crucial for understanding the rest of the paper:
-Quasi-Identifier (QI): a set of attributes that can be used with certain external information to identify a specific individual.
the projection of T to the set of attributes contained in QI.
: k-anonymous data generated from T with respect to the attributes in the Quasi-Identifier QI.
Definition 2. T k [QI] satisfies k-anonymity if and only if each record in it appears at least k times.
Let T be Table 1 , T k be Table 2 and QI = {AREA, POSITION, SALARY}. According to Definition 2, T k [QI] satisfies 3-anonymity. Several algorithms have been proposed to generate k-anonymous data [17, 8, 18] . Datafly [8, 18] is a simple and effective algorithm, so for demonstration of our protocol, Datafly is used to make local data k-anonymous. Algorithm 1 presents several key steps in Datafly (detailed explanations regarding this algorithm can be found in [8] ). The main step in most k-anonymity protocols Ai ∈ QI having the most number of distinct values 4:
freq ← generalize the values of Ai ∈ freq 5: end while 6: freq ← suppress sequences in freq occurring less than k times 7: freq ← enforce k requirement on suppressed tuples in freq 8:
is to substitute a specific value with a more general value. 
The Protocol: DPP 2 GA
Before presenting the protocol, we present an alternative view of k-anonymity. Define T k to be the k-anonymous data computed from T . Let x y denote that x is directly generalized from y. E.g., in 
Theorem 2. T k achieved through generalization satisfies k-anonymity if and only if
Proof. ⇒: Given generalized values t , if t ∈ T k then there is a set S of identical t i ∈ T k s.t. |S| ≥ k and t = t i (by the definition of k-anonymity). Each t i ∈ S t ∈ T . Since we cannot distinguish between the t i s, the probability that we have a particular t i = 1 S ≤ 1 k . Thus the probability that t is generalized from a particular t i is P rob [t 
k , and t be the record with the highest such probability for a generalization from t. Since the generalization is done according to a hierarchy, t must generalize to a (uniquely determined) single node in each hierarchy. This defines the only allowed values for t . Thus all
k . Since t must uniquely generalize to one of the t i , the sum of probabilities must be 1. Thus there must be at least k t i ∈ T k that are identical to t , so k-anonymity holds for t .
From Theorem 2, the privacy constraint P in our application domain can be formally defined as: inferences from
We will revisit this privacy constraint when proving that the proposed protocol is privacypreserving.
Since the protocol can utilize any k-anonymity algorithm to compute locally anonymous data, we call the proposed approach Distributed Privacy-Preserving two-Party Generic Anonymizer (DPP 2 GA). The protocol is presented in Section 3.1, Section 3.2 proves the correctness of the protocol and Section 3.3 proves the protocol satisfies the k-anonymity privacy constraint.
DPP 2 GA
The protocol is executed between two parties: P1 and P2. Let T refer to Table  1 
and QI = {AREA, POSITION, SALARY}. T is vertically partitioned into T 1 ≡ T [ID, AREA, POSITION] and T 2 ≡ T [ID, SALARY, SSN] stored at P1
and P2 respectively. Also, assume P1 and P2 are semi-honest in that they follow the execution of the protocol but may later use the information seen to try to violate privacy. (Discussion of the privacy properties under stronger adversarial models omitted due to space constraints.)
The key idea of the protocol is based on Theorem 1. Initially, each party Pi (i = 1 or 2) makes his data k-anonymous locally (for simplicity, Datafly is used for illustration). Based on this locally k-anonymous data, a set γ i is produced containing IDs partitioned into subsets. The two parties then compare γ Table 3 ) and 
) . Note that the encryption is applied to individual value, and we also adopt the commutative encryption scheme described in [19] , but any other commutative encryption scheme can also be used. The key property of this scheme is that P1 computes EK P 1 (γ 1 c ) and sends it to P2; 7:
P1 receives EK P 2 (γ 2 c ) and computes
Key steps in our approach are highlighted in Algorithm 2. The algorithm is written as executed by P1. Note that synchronization is needed for the counter c, and the encryption keys are different for each round. When the loop is executed more than once, the algorithm requires local data to be generalized one step further before computing the next γ 1 c at Step 5. At step 10, the symbol represents the one-to-one join operator on the ID attribute to create globally k-anonymous dataset from the two locally k-anonymous datasets.
Proof of Correctness
In this section, we prove Algorithm 2 achieves global k-anonymity. Refer to notations adopted in Section 3.1, let γ 
Proof. Let's prove the above theorem by contrapositive. In other words, prove the following statement:
is not k-anonymous, then there exists a subset of records 
Proof of Privacy Preservation
Referring to Step 9 in Algorithm 2, although equality is tested on the encrypted version of γ We classify inference problems into two types: final inference problem (FIP) and intermediate inference problem (IIP) . FIP refers to the implication when the inequality occurs at Step 9 of Algorithm 2 only once. IIP refers to the implication when the inequality occurs multiple times. Let T k [QI] be the k-anonymous data computed by Algorithm 2. , where x ∈ I c+1 and y ∈ I c . If x is not directly generalized from y of any I c , then
Next, we show a concrete example that illustrates why FIP does not violate kanonymity. Refer to γ 
[q] such that 0 < |I| < k. Similar to the previous analysis, the following two conditions hold: 
. As a result, P rob[x t ∈ T ] is the same for all records in I c+1 . The inference effect caused by I c is independent from one equality test to the next one. Consequently, the effect of IIP is the same as that of FIP.
The equality test between γ 1 c and γ 2 c is not the focal point of this paper. It is fairly simple to derive, so we do not provide any specifics about how to perform the equality test. In addition, we note that if |I c | ≥ k, the records in the I c do not violate the privacy constraint due to the definition of k-anonymity.
Conclusion / Future Work
Privacy of information in databases is an increasingly visible issue. Partitioning data is effective at preventing misuse of data, but it also makes beneficial use more difficult. One way to preserve privacy while enabling beneficial use of data is to utilize k-anonymity for publishing data. Maintaining the benefits of partitioning while generating integrated k-anonymous data requires a protocol that does not violate the k-anonymity privacy constraint. In this paper, we have laid out this problem and presented a two-party protocol DPP 2 GA that is proven to preserve the constraint. It is a generic protocol in a sense that any k-anonymity protocol can be used to compute locally k-anonymous data.
One disadvantage of DPP 2 GA is that it may not produce as precise data (with respect to the precision metric defined in [8] ) as other k-anonymity algorithms do when data are not partitioned. For instance, DPP 2 GA could be modified to simulate Datafly. At Step 9 of Algorithm 2, when the equality does not hold, only the party with the attribute that has most distinct values globally should generalize the data. Then the equality test would be performed on the newly computed Γ 1 c+1 with previously used Γ 2 c . The data generated this way are the same as those computed by Datafly.
Even though this approach may produce more precise data, it does introduce additional inference problems because some Γ i c+j may be compared more than once. It is not obvious that this additional inference must (or can) violate kanonymity with respect to individual parties, but proving this formally is not an easy task. One key design philosophy of DPP 2 GA is to provably eliminate such inference problems, so DPP 2 GA sacrifices a certain degree of precision. More precise protocols with fewer or no inference problems are a worthwhile challenge for future research. Another observation we have during the design of DPP 2 GA is that more precise data can also be generated by removing already k-anonymous data at the end of each round (resulting in different data being generalized to different levels). Again, providing a formal method to analyze the inference problem might be very difficult, but this provides a valuable future research direction. DPP 2 GA is not a SMC protocol because it introduces certain inference problems, such as FIP and IIP. However, based on our analyses, both FIP and IIP do not violate the k-anonymity privacy constraint. Formally defining and understanding the differences between privacy-preserving and Secure Multiparty Computation may open up many new opportunities for designing protocols that preserve privacy.
